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Abstract. This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle
system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the d-
dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two
possible strategies. Following the traditional modeling approach of spatial games,
the configuration is turned into a payoff landscape that assigns a payoff to each
player based on her strategy and the strategy of her neighbors. The payoff is then
interpreted as a fitness, by having each player independently update their strategy
at rate one by mimicking their neighbor with the largest payoff. With these rules,
the mean-field approximation of the spatial game exhibits the same asymptotic
behavior as the popular replicator equation. Except for a coexistence result that
shows an agreement between the process and the mean-field model, our analysis
reveals that the two models strongly disagree in many aspects, showing in particular
that the presence of a spatial structure in the form of local interactions plays a key
role. More precisely, in the parameter region where both strategies are evolutionary
stable in the replicator equation, in the spatial model either one strategy wins
or the system fixates to a configuration where both strategies are present. In
addition, while defection is evolutionary stable for the prisoner’s dilemma game in
the replicator equation, space favors cooperation in our model.
1. Introduction
There are a number of spatially explicit models of community dynamics, i.e., models
where individuals are located on a geometrical structure and can only interact with
nearby individuals, for which the long-term behavior has been proved to strongly
differ from that of their non-spatial counterparts. See for instance [6, 16] for a
discussion on this aspect. This shows that space is often a key component in
how communities are shaped. This paper studies an interacting particle system
of evolutionary games which turns out to be a good illustration of the fact that
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space matters in the sense that the results we collect show significant discrepancies
between the spatially explicit stochastic model and its so-called mean-field version.
Evolutionary game theory was proposed by theoretical biologist Maynard Smith
and first appeared in [15]. Although evolutionary games were originally introduced
to understand animal conflicts, they now have a number of important applications
in various branches of social sciences. From a mathematical point of view, the
stochastic process we consider is an example of interacting particle system ([13, 14])
where each vertex of the d-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player, who
is characterized by her strategy. Thus, the state of the system at time t is a spatial
configuration
ξt : Z
d → {1, 2, . . . , n} = set of strategies.
The dynamics depends on a payoff matrix A = (aij) where aij denotes the payoff
of a type i player interacting with a type j player. In the presence of two strategies,
which we assume from now on, there are exactly 4! = 24 possible orderings of
the four payoffs. Since there is symmetry under exchange of type labels, we may
assume a12 ≤ a21, which gives twelve possible games or strategic situations. The
most popular such games are the prisoner’s dilemma, the hawk-dove game and the
stag hunt game. To define the evolution rules, we let M be an integer referred to
as the range of the interactions and let
Nx = {z 6= x : maxi=1,2,...,d |zi − xi| ≤M}
fi(x, ξ) = card {z ∈ Nx : ξ(z) = i}/((2M + 1)d − 1)
be respectively the interaction neighborhood of site x and the fraction of neighbors
of that site following strategy i. Having a payoff matrix and a spatial configuration
induces a so-called payoff landscape that assigns a payoff to each player on the
infinite integer lattice by setting
φ(x, ξ) = ai1 f1(x, ξ) + ai2 f2(x, ξ) when ξ(x) = i.
The basic idea and starting point of evolutionary game theory is to turn the game
into a dynamical system by interpreting the payoff as fitness or reproduction success,
meaning that the type or strategy of a player is more likely to be selected at each
interaction as her payoff gets larger. Specifically, the model considered in this paper
evolves according to the following simple rules:
4. Players update their strategy at rate one by mimicking their neighbor with
the largest payoff. In case of a tie, meaning that two neighbors with different
strategies share the same highest payoff, the new strategy is chosen uniformly
at random by flipping a fair coin.
This model is chronologically the last one of a series of four that we have studied
so far. The first three models are built from the following rules.
1. Payoff affecting birth and death rates [12]. When a player has a positive
payoff, at rate this payoff, one of her neighbors chosen at random adopts her
strategy, whereas when her payoff is negative, at rate minus this payoff, she
adopts the strategy of one of her neighbors chosen at random. This updating
rule is inspired from [1].
2. Best-response dynamics [7]. Players update their strategy at rate one
in order to maximize their payoff, which depends on the strategy of their
neighbors.
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3. Death-birth updating process [8]. Players update their strategy at rate
one by mimicking a neighbor chosen at random according to probabilities that
are proportional to the neighbors’ payoff. The weak selection approximation
of this process, which is a voter model perturbation, has first been studied
heuristically in [17] and then analytically in [2, 4] using duality techniques for
interacting particle systems.
Note that the model we consider in this paper can be viewed as a nonlinear version of
the death-birth updating process in the sense that, like in the death-birth process,
players update their strategy at rate one by mimicking one of their neighbors,
but unlike in the death-birth process, they always choose to imitate their fittest
neighbor. In spite of their similarities, the two models exhibit different behaviors
and the approaches to study them strongly differ. To turn our verbal description
of the evolution rules into equations, we define
Φi(x, ξ) = sup {φ(z, ξ) : z ∈ Nx and ξ(z) = i} for i = 1, 2,
which by convention = −∞ when there is no type i neighbor. This random vari-
able keeps track of the largest payoff among all the neighbors of site x who follow
strategy i. Then, the transition rates at vertex x are given by
1 → 2 at rate 1{Φ1(x, ξ) < Φ2(x, ξ)}
+ (1/2)1{Φ1(x, ξ) = Φ2(x, ξ)}
2 → 1 at rate 1{Φ1(x, ξ) > Φ2(x, ξ)}
+ (1/2)1{Φ1(x, ξ) = Φ2(x, ξ)}.
(1.1)
In each transition, the first indicator function means that the player always mimics
her fittest neighbor while the second indicator function means that, in case of a tie,
she chooses her new strategy at random by tossing a fair coin.
2. Main results
Since one of our main objectives is to understand and quantify the role of space
in the interactions among players, the first step is to briefly study the mean-field
model. Letting ui denote the frequency of players following strategy i and assuming
that the population is well-mixing gives the differential equation
u′1(t) = − u1 1{a11u1 + a12u2 > a21u1 + a22u2}
+ u2 1{a11u1 + a12u2 < a21u1 + a22u2}.
To study the mean-field model and describe its bifurcation diagram, it is convenient
to adopt the approach of [11] by introducing the new parameters
a1 = a11 − a21 and a2 = a22 − a12
and declaring strategy i to be
• altruistic when ai < 0, i.e., a player with strategy i confers a lower payoff to
a player with the same strategy than the other strategy,
• selfish when ai > 0, i.e., a player with strategy i confers a higher payoff to a
player with the same strategy than the other strategy.
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Figure 2.1. List of the most popular two-person symmetric games.
In terms of a1 and a2, the mean-field model reduces to
du1
dt
=


−u1 when a1u1 > a2u2
0 when a1u1 = a2u2
u2 when a1u1 < a2u2.
Using that u1 + u2 = 1 gives the three fixed points
e1 = 1 and e2 = 0 and e∗ =
a2
a1 + a2
whose global stability is as follows:
• strategy i wins if it is selfish and the other strategy altruistic:
e∗ /∈ (0, 1) and limt→∞ ui(t) = 1 for all ui(0) ∈ (0, 1),
• when both strategies are altruistic, coexistence occurs:
e∗ ∈ (0, 1) and limt→∞ u1(t) = e∗ for all ui(0) ∈ (0, 1),
• when both strategies are selfish, the system is bistable:
limt→∞ u1(t) = 0 for all u1(0) < e∗ ∈ (0, 1)
limt→∞ u1(t) = 1 for all u1(0) > e∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Recalling that a strategy is said to be evolutionary stable if, when adopted by a
population, it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy starting at an infinites-
imally small frequency, the dynamics of the mean-field model can be summarized
as: a strategy is evolutionary stable if and only if it is selfish.
We now turn our attention to the spatial model (1.1). To visualize our results,
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we turn the four-dimensional parameter space into a two-dimensional picture by
fixing the payoffs a12 and a21. The five straight lines
{a11 = a12} {a11 = a21} {a22 = a12} {a22 = a21} {a11 = a22}
induce a partition of the set of parameters into twelve regions corresponding to the
twelve possible strategic relationships. These twelve regions are shown in Figure 2.1
along with the names of the most popular games in the a11 − a22 plane under the
assumption a12 < a21. Our main results stated and explained below are summarized
in the two phase diagrams of Figures 2.2–2.3.
To begin with, we look at parameter regions where at least one of the two
strategies is selfish. To understand the spatial model in this case, we observe that,
when the minimum payoff of a type 1 player exceeds the maximum payoff of a
type 2 player over all possible configurations, i.e.,
min (a11, a12) > max (a21, a22), (2.1)
the set of type 1 players becomes a pure growth process: type 1 players never
change their strategy whereas each type 2 player with at least one type 1 neighbor
changes her strategy at rate one. This implies that strategy 1 wins, in agreement
with the mean-field model. This result can be improved upon by comparing the
set of players for whom they and their neighbors eventually maintain strategy 1 to
the limit of a certain bootstrap percolation process.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that the process starts from a translation invariant product
measure with a positive density of each type. Then,
(1) there is fixation to a configuration with a positive density of strategy 1 (in
particular, strategy 2 cannot win) when
a11 > max (a21, a22)
(2) strategy 1 wins when
(N − 1) a11 +min (a11, a12) > N max (a21, a22)
where N = card (Nx) = (2M + 1)
d − 1 is the neighborhood size.
By symmetry, we also have that
• there is fixation to a configuration with a positive density of strategy 2 (in
particular, strategy 1 cannot win) when
a22 > max (a11, a12)
• strategy 2 wins when
(N − 1) a22 +min (a21, a22) > N max (a11, a12).
See Figure 2.2 for a picture of the phase diagram in the a11 − a22 plane. Note that
the parameter regions not covered by the theorem are
• the region where both strategies are altruistic corresponding to the battle
of the sexes, the leader game and the hawk-dove game, and
• the triangular region corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma game,
and we now focus our attention on and collect results for the spatial model in these
two more challenging parameter regions in the one-dimensional case.
First, when both strategies are altruistic, numerical simulations suggest that
coexistence occurs provided the range of the interactions is large. The result is
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Figure 2.2. Phase diagram of the death and birth of the fittest process in the a11−
a22 plane under the assumption that a12 < a21 showing the parameter regions
covered by Theorem 2.1 delimited by the thick solid lines.
difficult to prove in the general case but we were able to show it for the one-
dimensional system under some symmetric condition.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that
a11 = a22 < a12 = a21 and d = 1
and that the process starts from a translation invariant product measure with a
positive density of each type. Then,
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) 6= 0 for all x 6= y and M large enough.
To establish the theorem, we will show that if an interval of length 7M has at
least log(M) players of each type then, with probability close to one, a certain
translation of this interval will satisfy the same property after some fixed deter-
ministic time. In addition to large deviation estimates to prove that the number
of representatives of a given strategy in a given interval cannot vary too fast, the
key ingredient is that, as long as the target interval does not contain any type i
player, the rightmost type i player to the left of this interval is the fittest neighbor
of all her neighbors with the possibility of a tie. This will be used to show that the
minority type can spread and invade nearby regions.
To understand the role of space in the prisoner’s dilemma game, we now special-
ize in the one-dimensional system with nearest neighbor interactions. In this case,
the process can be studied by looking at the interfaces between blocks of type 1
players and blocks of type 2 players.
To begin with, we look at the system starting from an arbitrary configuration
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with a finite interval of players following strategy 1 not limited to translation in-
variant product measures. A natural question in this case is to determine whether
the players in the initial interval of 1s may change their strategy or not. Our next
result gives a lower bound for the probability that these players following initially
strategy 1 never change their strategy under the assumption
a11 + a12 > a22 +max (a21, a22) and 2a11 > a21 + a22, (2.2)
This bound is uniform in all possible initial configurations outside the interval of
type 1 players. More precisely, let
Λm = {ξ ∈ {1, 2}Z : ξ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [−m,m] ∩ Z}
be the set of all the possible configurations that have a row of 2m + 1 players
following strategy 1 centered at the origin, and let
φ =
1 +
√
5
2
= the golden ratio.
Then, techniques from martingale theory give the following result.
Theorem 2.3. Let M = d = 1, m ≥ 1 and assume (2.2). Then,
infξ0∈Λm P (ξt ∈ Λm for all t) ≥
(
1− 1
φ
)2
=
7− 3√5
2
.
By symmetry, we have the same result for strategy 2 in the parameter region
obtained from (2.2) by exchanging the role of the two strategies, i.e.,
a21 + a22 > a11 +max (a12, a11) and 2a22 > a11 + a12. (2.3)
The two parameter regions (2.2)–(2.3) covered by Theorem 2.3 can be conveniently
visualized in the a11 − a22 plane as follows. Letting
D0 = straight line with slope 1 going through (a21, a12)
D1 = straight line with slope
1
2 going through (a12, a12)
D2 = straight line with slope 2 going through (a21, a21)
with the two payoffs a12 and a21 being fixed,
• the payoffs a11 and a22 satisfy (2.2) if and only if point (a11, a22) is below
all three straight lines,
• the payoffs a11 and a22 satisfy (2.3) if and only if point (a11, a22) is above
all three straight lines.
See Figure 2.3 for a picture of the three straight lines in the a11 − a22 plane.
Finally, we assume that the process starts from a translation invariant product
measure with a positive density of each strategy. Since in this case the initial
configuration contains infinitely many rows of say three type 1 players, it directly
follows from Theorem 2.3 and the ergodic theorem that, with probability one, at
least one of these rows will expand without bound. This shows that strategy 1
wins when (2.2) holds and that strategy 2 wins when (2.3) holds. By identifying
finite patterns with a mixture of 1s and 2s that are stable, i.e., patterns that cannot
change under the dynamics, when
(2a11 > a21 + a22 and 2a22 > a11 + a12) or
(2a11 > a21 + a22 > a11 + a12) or (2a22 > a11 + a12 > a21 + a22),
(2.4)
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Figure 2.3. Phase diagram of the one-dimensional nearest-neighbor process in
the a11 − a22 plane under the assumption that a12 < a21. The parameter regions
covered by Theorem 2.4 are delimited by the thick solid lines. The grey triangle
refers to the parameter region of the prisoner’s dilemma game.
since these patterns are finite and therefore occur infinitely often in the initial
configuration, we can also prove that, when (2.4) holds, the system fixates to a
random configuration with infinitely many type 1 players and infinitely many type 2
players. Summarizing, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4. LetM = d = 1 and assume that the process starts from a translation
invariant product measure with a positive density of each type. Then,
(1) strategy 1 wins when (2.2) holds,
(2) strategy 2 wins when (2.3) holds,
(3) there is fixation to a translation invariant random configuration in which
both strategies are present when (2.4) holds.
Using again the three straight lines introduced above, the parameter region (2.4)
in which the process fixates corresponds to
• all the parameter pairs (a11, a22) which are below the straight line D2 and
above either D0 or D1 when a12 < a21,
and we refer to Figure 2.3 for a picture. Note that the figure shows several dis-
agreements between the spatial and the mean-field models. For instance, in the
prisoner’s dilemma triangular region characterized by
a12 < a22 < a11 < a21
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when strategy 1 is cooperation and strategy 2 is defection, defectors always win in
the mean-field model whereas there is a subset of this parameter region in which
there is fixation for the one-dimensional system. This subset is the triangle below
the median starting at (a21, a21) in the prisoner’s dilemma triangle.
The parameter region which is not covered by Theorem 2.4 is the region below
the straight line D1 but above D2, i.e.,
2a11 < a21 + a22 and 2a22 < a11 + a12.
Note that D0 divides this region into two parts. To fix the ideas, we look at the
sub-region below the straight line D0 which gives the condition
2a11 < a21 + a22 and a11 + a12 > a22 +max (a21, a22). (2.5)
In this case, starting with a finite interval of type 1 players while all the other players
initially follow strategy 2, the length of the type 1 interval evolves according to a
simple symmetric random walk except that, when the length reaches two, it cannot
further shrink. In particular, due to recurrence, the system fluctuates, i.e., all the
players change their strategy infinitely often with probability one. This implies that
none of the two strategies wins and that Theorem 2.3 does not hold in the parameter
region (2.5). Since in addition type 2 players with two type 1 neighbors change their
strategy at rate one, when starting with a large but finite number of type 1 players,
the type 1 intervals merge together until there is only one type 1 interval, which
leads to the same conclusion: the system fluctuates. For the system starting with
a translation invariant product measure, we conjecture that strategy 1 wins in the
parameter region (2.5) because the previous picture suggests that the connected
component starting from an interval of type 2 players should be swallowed by the
two nearby type 1 intervals. However, we have not been able to turn this heuristics
into a proof because in the pattern
(2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
the 1 which is underlined can turn into a 2, and so does the 1 next to it after such
an update. This shows in particular that the length of each type 2 interval can
make arbitrarily big jumps and is therefore difficult to control.
3. Coupling with bootstrap percolation
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.1. The first part of the theorem
relies on a strong monotonicity result for the process rescaled in space that basically
states that large hypercubes of type 1 players cannot break when
a11 > max (a21, a22). (3.1)
Under the stronger assumption of the second part
(N − 1) a11 +min (a11, a12) > N max (a21, a22), (3.2)
we show that not only the rescaled process is almost surely nondecreasing but also
it expands at least like a certain bootstrap percolation model which, together with
a result in [18], is the key to proving the second part of the theorem.
Throughout this section, configurations of spin systems are often identified with
the corresponding set of vertices in state 1 to simplify some of the expressions. In
addition, we think of the evolutionary game model as being generated from a Harris’
graphical representation [9], i.e., a collection of independent Poisson processes. In
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contrast with the classical death-birth updating process in which players update
their strategy by mimicking a neighbor chosen with a probability proportional to
the neighbor’s payoff, the new strategy is now chosen deterministically except when
there is a tie. In particular, the graphical representation reduces to a collection of
rate one Poisson processes, with one process attached to each vertex, together
with a collection of independent Bernoulli random variables. More precisely, for
each x ∈ Zd,
• we let (Nt(x) : t ≥ 0) be a rate one Poisson process,
• we denote by Tn(x) its nth arrival time: Tn(x) = inf {t : Nt(x) = n},
• we let Bn(x) = Bernoulli (1/2) for n > 0 be independent.
We think of Tn(x) as the nth time at which the player at x updates her strategy
while the Bernoulli random variables are only used in case of a tie. Since the
Poisson processes attached to different players are independent and the number
of players is countable, with probability one, there are no simultaneous updates.
Assuming that the process has been constructed up to time t− where t = Tn(x), the
new configuration is determined from the following rule, where we abuse notation
somewhat to view ξ as the set {x : ξ(x) = 1}.
• In case x ∈ ξt−, we set ξt = ξt− \ {x} if and only if
(Φ1(x, ξt) < Φ2(x, ξt)) or (Φ1(x, ξt) = Φ2(x, ξt) and Bn(x) = 0),
• while if x /∈ ξt−, we set ξt = ξt− ∪ {x} if and only if
(Φ1(x, ξt) > Φ2(x, ξt)) or (Φ1(x, ξt) = Φ2(x, ξt) and Bn(x) = 1).
The result of [9], which holds for a large class of interacting systems, guarantees
that our process can indeed be constructed using these rules starting from any
initial configuration.
We now focus on the proof of the theorem. Declare a player to be a 1-center
when she and all her neighbors follow strategy 1. To keep track of such players, we
introduce the process
ηt(x) =
∏
z∈N¯x 1{ξt(z) = 1} where N¯x = Nx ∪ {x}.
With this definition, the player at vertex x is a 1-center if and only if ηt(x) = 1.
Identifying every configuration ηt with the set of vertices in state 1, i.e., with the
set of 1-centers, we have the following strong monotonicity result, which is the key
to proving the first part of the theorem.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (3.1). Then, P (ηs ⊂ ηt) = 1 for all s ≤ t.
In words, the result states that a 1-center is stable in the sense that it remains
a 1-center forever. This is due to the fact that 1-centers get the largest possible
payoff and therefore inspire all of their neighbors to stick to strategy 1. We now
turn our heuristics into a rigorous proof.
Proof: Let x ∈ ηs be a 1-center at time s. By definition of a 1-center, there is
no player following strategy 2 in the neighborhood of vertex x, therefore
limǫ→0 (1/ǫ)P (x /∈ ξs+ǫ |x ∈ ηs) = 0. (3.3)
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Observe in addition that, since (3.1) holds, for all y /∈ ξs,
φ(y, ξs) = a21 f1(y, ξs) + a22 f2(y, ξs) ≤ max (a21, a22)
< a11 = a11 f1(x, ξs) + a12 f2(x, ξs) = φ(x, ξs)
indicating that the payoff of a 1-center is always greater than the payoff of a type 2
player. This implies that, for all z ∈ Nx necessarily of type 1,
Φ1(z, ξs) = supw∈Nz φ(w, ξs)1{w ∈ ξs}
≥ φ(x, ξs) > supw∈Nz φ(w, ξs)1{w /∈ ξs} = Φ2(z, ξs).
In particular, for all z ∈ Nx,
limǫ→0 (1/ǫ)P (z /∈ ξs+ǫ |x ∈ ηs)
= 1{Φ1(x, ξ) < Φ2(x, ξ)} + (1/2)1{Φ1(x, ξ) = Φ2(x, ξ)} = 0.
(3.4)
It follows from (3.3)–(3.4) that, once a player and all of her neighbors are of type 1,
which makes her a 1-center, they remain so forever. 
Recall that N¯x = Nx ∪ {x}. The first part of Theorem 2.1 directly follows from
Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.1. Assume that ρ > 0 and (3.1) holds. Then,
P (x ∈ η0) = P (N¯x ⊂ ξ0) =
∏
y∈N¯x P (y ∈ ξ0) = ρN+1 > 0
where N = card (Nx). This and Lemma 3.1 imply that
lim supt→∞ P (ξt(x) = 2) = 1− lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 1)
≤ 1− P (x ∈ ξt for all t) ≤ 1− P (x ∈ η0) = 1− ρN+1 < 1
therefore strategy 2 cannot win. 
To prove the second part of the theorem, we compare the set of 1-centers with
one of models of bootstrap percolation studied in [18]. This process is the discrete-
time two-state spin system that starts from a random configuration but evolves
deterministically as follows: occupied vertices remain occupied forever and empty
vertices become occupied at the next time step if and only if at least one of their
two nearest neighbors in each of the d directions is occupied. More formally, iden-
tifying the state of the process with the set of occupied sites, the dynamics of this
bootstrap percolation model is described by
x ∈ ζt+1 if and only if
x ∈ ζt or ζt ∩ {x− ei, x+ ei} 6= ∅ for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
(3.5)
for all (x, t) ∈ Zd × N where ei is the ith unit vector in Zd. Since this process
evolves in discrete time whereas our process evolves in continuous time, rather
than a stochastic domination at every time, we will prove that the infinite time
limit of bootstrap percolation is a subset of its counterpart for our process. To
compare the infinite time limits, we first note that
a11 ≤ max (a21, a22) implies that
(N − 1) a11 +min (a11, a12) ≤ Na11 ≤ N max (a21, a22)
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showing that condition (3.2) implies condition (3.1). From this and Lemma 3.1, we
deduce that, whenever condition (3.2) is satisfied, we have
x ∈ ηs implies that x ∈ ηt for all t ≥ s. (3.6)
The second key ingredient is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Assume (3.2). Then, for all t ≥ s,
P (x /∈ ηt | ηs ∩ {x− ei, x+ ei} 6= ∅ for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d) ≤ e−(t−s).
Proof: By symmetry of the evolution rules, it suffices to prove the upper bound for
the conditional probability given the particular event
A = {x− ei ∈ ηs for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d}. (3.7)
Let x+ = x+
∑
iMei. Noticing that
N¯x ∩ N¯x−ei = {x+
∑
j cj ej : −M ≤ cj ≤M and ci 6=M}
for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we deduce that⋃
i (N¯x ∩ N¯x−ei) =
⋃
i {x+
∑
j cj ej : −M ≤ cj ≤M and ci 6= M}
= {x+∑j cj ej : −M ≤ cj ≤M and ∑j cj 6= dM} = N¯x \ {x+}.
Since (3.7) and Lemma 3.1 imply that x− ei ∈ ηt for all t ≥ s,
N¯x \ {x+} ⊂
⋃
i N¯x−ei ⊂ ξt (3.8)
for all times t ≥ s, indicating that, except maybe for the player at vertex x+, the
player at vertex x and all the players in the neighborhood of x follow strategy 1 at
time s and after. Now, we distinguish two cases depending on whether the player
at vertex x+ follows strategy 1 or strategy 2 at time s.
Case 1. Assume that x+ ∈ ξs. This and (3.8) imply that N¯x ⊂ ξs so the player
at x is a 1-center and it follows from Lemma 3.1 that
x ∈ ηt and P (x /∈ ηt |A and x+ ∈ ξs) = 0 for all t ≥ s. (3.9)
Case 2. Assume now that x+ /∈ ξs and let
T = inf {t > s : t = Tn(x+) for some n ∈ N∗}
be the time of the next update at vertex x+. From (3.8), we get
φ(x, ξt) = a11 f1(x, ξt) + a12 f2(x, ξt)
= (1/N)(card (Nx \ {x+}) a11 + a12)
= (1/N)((N − 1) a11 + a12)
≥ (1/N)((N − 1) a11 +min (a11, a12))
for all times t ∈ (s, T ). In particular, under the assumption (3.2), for all vertices y
occupied by a type 2 player in the time interval t ∈ (s, T ),
φ(x, ξt) ≥ (1/N)((N − 1) a11 +min (a11, a12))
> max (a21, a22) ≥ φ(y, ξt)
indicating that, just before the update time T , the type 1 player at vertex x has a
larger payoff than all type 2 players. Recalling the transition rates of the process
and that vertex x is in the neighborhood of vertex x+, this implies that the state
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of x+ switches to 1 at time T . In particular, using also the inclusion (3.8) and
Lemma 3.1, we obtain the implications
x+ ∈ ξT implies that N¯x ⊂ ξT
implies that x ∈ ηT
implies that x ∈ ηt for all t ≥ T.
Observing finally that T − s = Exponential (1), we get
P (x /∈ ηt |A and x+ /∈ ξs) = P (T > t)
= P (T − s > t− s) = e−(t−s) (3.10)
for all times t ≥ s.
Combining (3.9)–(3.10), we conclude that
P (x /∈ ηt |A) ≤ P (x /∈ ηt |A and x+ ∈ ξs) ∨ P (x /∈ ηt |A and x+ /∈ ξs)
= max (0, e−(t−s)) = e−(t−s)
which completes the proof. 
The second part of Theorem 2.1 follows from (3.6) and Lemma 3.2 together with a
result of [18] about the bootstrap percolation model.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.2. Summarizing (2.1) and the proof of Lemma 3.2, the
transition rates describing the evolution of the process (ηt), i.e., the dynamics of
the 1-centers, are given by
c0→1(x, ηt) = 1{ηt ∩ {x− ei, x+ ei} 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2, . . . , d}
c1→0(x, ηt) = 0.
Comparing with the evolution rules in (3.5), this implies that
limt→∞ ζt ⊂ limt→∞ ηt when ζ0 ⊂ η0. (3.11)
Note that the infinite time limit indeed exists for both processes due to monotonic-
ity, i.e., the set of vertices in state 1 cannot decrease. To also compare the initial
configurations of the two processes, assume that, initially, vertices are indepen-
dently in state 1 with probability
P (ξ0(x) = 1) = ρ and P (ζ0(x) = 1) = ρ
N+1.
Then, for all F ⊂ Zd finite,
P (F ⊂ η0) = P (F + N¯0 ⊂ ξ0)
= ρ card (F+N¯0) ≥ (ρN+1)card (F ) = P (F ⊂ ζ0)
(3.12)
where we use the fact that
card (F + N¯0) = card {x+ y : x ∈ F and y ∈ N¯0}
≤ card (F ) card (N¯0).
Hence, the initial configuration of 1-centers dominates stochastically the initial
configuration of occupied sites. Also, by [18, Theorem 3.1], when starting from a
product measure with a positive density of occupied sites,
limt→∞ ζt = limt→∞{x ∈ Zd : ζt(x) = 1} = Zd. (3.13)
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Combining (3.11)–(3.13), we conclude that, when ρ > 0 and (3.2) holds,
limt→∞ ξt ⊃ limt→∞ ηt ⊃ limt→∞ ζt = Zd
showing that strategy 1 wins. 
4. Coexistence of altruistic strategies
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.2. In particular, it is assumed
throughout this section that the spatial dimension d = 1 and that
a− = a11 = a22 and a+ = a12 = a21 with a− < a+.
The underlying ingredient is a block construction, which consists in coupling the
process properly rescaled in space and time with oriented site percolation. To set
the space scale, for all z ∈ Z, we consider the spatial regions
Az = 7Mz + (−3M/2, 3M/2) and Bz = 7Mz + (−7M/2, 7M/2).
Then, the main objective is to prove that there is a time T such that the following
events occur with probability close to one when M is large.
(1) Starting with at least log(M) players with strategy 1 in the interval B0, at
least one of these players does not change her strategy by time T .
(2) As long as the interval A1 does not contain any type 1 player, the rightmost
such player to the left of this interval spreads strategy 1 to her right to bring
a type 1 player in A1 by time T/2.
(3) Once there is a type 1 player in A1, strategy 1 spreads fast until there are
at least
√
M players following strategy 1 in the interval B1.
(4) At least log(M) of these
√
M players still follow strategy 1 at time T thus
producing the same initial condition as in 1 but translated in space and
time by the vector (7M,T ).
In addition, the previous events, which are depicted in Figure 4.4, also occur with
probability close to one after exchanging the role of both strategies. To turn our
sketch into a proof, for every finite subset B ⊂ Z and i = 1, 2, we let
Σit(B) = card {x ∈ B : ξt(x) = i} and Σt(B) = Σ1t (B) ∧ Σ2t (B)
be the number of type i players in B and the number of players in B following the
minority strategy, respectively. Also, let T (B) be the first time there is at least one
type 1 and one type 2 player in B, and consider the four good events
D1 = Σ0(B0) > log(M)
D2 = Σt(B0) 6= 0 for all t ∈ (0, T )
D3 = T (A1) ≤ T/2
D4 = Σt(B1) >
√
M for some t ∈ (0, T ).
Note that these events correspond the the events described verbally in 1–4 above
and are arranged in chronological order. The fact that each of these events occurs
with probability close to one is proved in the following four lemmas again following
their chronological order.
Lemma 4.1. For all time T > 0,
P (Σ1t (B0) = 0 for some t ∈ (0, T ) |D1) ≤ (1− e−T )log(M).
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Figure 4.4. Schematic picture of the four events in 1–4.
Proof: On the event D1, there exists A ⊂ B0 such that
card (A) = log(M) and ξ0(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A.
Then, the conditional probability to be estimated is bounded by the probability
that all the players in A update their strategy by time T . Since in addition players
update their strategy independently at rate one, we deduce that
P (Σ1t (B0) = 0 for some t ∈ (0, T ) |D1)
≤ P (Σ1t (A) = 0 for some t ∈ (0, T )) ≤ P (T1(x) < T for all x ∈ A)
=
∏
x∈A P (T1(x) < T ) = (1− e−T )log(M).
This completes the proof. 
For every subset B ⊂ Z and i = 1, 2, define
T i(B) = inf {t : ξt(x) = i for some x ∈ B}.
Lemma 4.2. For all ǫ > 0, there exists T > 0 such that
P (T 1(A1) > T/2 |D1 ∩D2) ≤ ǫ/8 for all M.
Proof: Let Xt be the rightmost type 1 player to the left of 7M −M/2, i.e.,
Xt = sup {x < 7M −M/2 : ξt(x) = 1}
and observe that, before time T 1(A1), the first 3M sites to the right of Xt are
occupied by type 2 players. It follows that, before the stopping time,
2M − Σt(NXt) ≥ M ≥ Σt(NXt+1)
≥ Σt(NXt+2) ≥ · · · ≥ Σt(NXt+2M ).
Using a− < a+, this implies that
z 7→ φt(Xt + z, ξt) is nonincreasing on {0, 1, . . . , 2M},
therefore, even in the worst case scenario of a tie,
lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s −Xt =M | ξt) ≥ 1/2 almost surely. (4.1)
Since jumps to the right are also bounded by the rangeM , the process (Xt) cannot
jump over A1 from left to right. In addition, in view of the size of the spatial
regions, on the event that there is at least one type 1 player in B0 at any time
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before T , the stopping time T 1(A1) is stochastically smaller than the time τ9 it
takes to see a sequence of nine jumps of length M to the right without jumps to
the left. Note also that, in view of (4.1), jumps of length M to the right occur
at rate at least one half whereas, regardless of the payoffs, jumps to the left occur
independently at rate one. This implies that time τ9 is equal in distribution to the
time until we see nine heads in a row while flipping a coin that comes up heads
with probability one third at the times of a Poisson process with rate three halves.
Clearly, time τ9 is almost surely finite and its density function does not depend on
the range of the interactions so there exists T large such that
P (T 1(A1) > T/2 |D1 ∩D2) ≤ P (τ9 > T/2) ≤ ǫ/8
for all M . This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4.3. For all M large,
P (Σ1t (B1) ≤
√
M for all t ∈ (0, T ) |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3) ≤ 1/
√
M.
Proof: To avoid trivialities, we assume that there are less than
√
M type 1 players
in the interval B1 at time T (A1). Then, on the event D3, there exists a site x0 ∈ A1,
fixed from now on, which is occupied by a type 1 player at time T (A1), and we
introduce the three stopping times
τx0 = inf {t > T (A1) : ξt(x0) = 2}
τ− = inf {t > T (A1) : Σ1t (B1) >
√
M}
τ+ = inf {t > T (A1) : card {x ∈ Nx0 : Nt(x) −NT (A1)(x) 6= 0} ≥
√
M}.
Since a− < a+, for all
T (A1) < t < min(τx0 , τ−) and x ∈ x0 + [−2M, 2M ] with ξt(x) = 2,
we have the following lower and upper bounds for the payoffs:
φ(x0, ξt) = a11f1(x0, ξt) + a12f2(x0, ξt)
= a−f1(x0, ξt) + a+f2(x0, ξt)
≥ (2M)−1 (a−
√
M + a+ (2M −
√
M)), and
φ(x, ξt) = a21f1(x, ξt) + a22f2(x, ξt)
= a+f1(x, ξt) + a−f2(x, ξt)
≤ (2M)−1 (a+
√
M + a− (2M −
√
M)) < φ(x0, ξt)
for all M sufficiently large. In particular, for all z ∈ Nx0,
Φ1(z, ξt) ≥ φ(x0, ξt)
> supx∈x0+[−2M,2M ] φ(x, ξt)1{ξt(x) = 2} ≥ Φ2(z, ξt)
which implies that, at least between times T (A1) and min(τx0 , τ−), each update in
the neighborhood of x0 results in strategy 1 being selected. It follows that
{τ+ ≤ τx0} ⊂ {τ− ≤ τ+} almost surely
which, in turn, gives the inclusions of events
{τ− > T (A1) + 1} ⊂ {τ+ < τ−} ∪ {τ+ > T (A1) + 1}
⊂ {τx0 < τ+} ∪ {τ+ > T (A1) + 1}.
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Taking the conditional probabilities on both sides, if T > 2 we get
P (Σ1t (B1) ≤
√
M for all t ∈ (0, T ) |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3)
≤ P (Σ1t (B1) ≤
√
M for all t ∈ (0, T (A1) + 1] |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3)
= P (τ− > T (A1) + 1 |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3)
≤ P (τx0 < τ+ or τ+ > T (A1) + 1)
≤ P (τx0 < τ+) + P (τ+ > T (A1) + 1).
(4.2)
Since the players in x0 + [−M,M ] update their strategy at the same rate, the
permutations of the times of their first update after T (A1) are equally likely, so
P (τx0 < τ+) ≤ P (inf {t > T (A1) : Nt(x0)−Nt−(x0) = 1} < τ+)
=
√
M/(2M + 1) ≤ 1/(2√M). (4.3)
In addition, lettingXi be independent exponential random variables with rate 2M−
i and using the memoryless property, we also have that
P (τ+ > T (A1) + 1) = P (X0 +X1 + · · ·+X√M−1 > 1)
≤ P (Xi > 1/
√
M for some i = 0, 1, . . . ,
√
M − 1)
≤
√
M P (XM > 1/
√
M)
=
√
M exp(−
√
M) ≤ 1/(2
√
M).
(4.4)
Combining (4.2)–(4.4) gives the desired result. 
Lemma 4.4. Let T > 0. Then, for all M large,
P (Σ1T (B1) ≤ log(M) |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3 ∩D4) ≤ exp(−(1/8) e−T
√
M).
Proof: On the event D4, there exist A ⊂ B1 and t ∈ (0, T ) such that
card (A) =
√
M and ξt(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A.
Since players update their strategy at rate one and the conditional probability of
interest is bounded by the probability that (for M large) at least
√
M − log(M) ≥ (1− (1/2)e−T )
√
M
players in A update their strategy in less than T time units,
P (Σ1T (B1) ≤ log(M) |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3 ∩D4)
≤ P (Σ1t (A) ≤ log(M) for some t ∈ (0, T ) | ξ0(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A)
≤ P (card {x ∈ A : T1(x) < T } ≥ (1− (1/2)e−T )
√
M)
≤ P (Binomial (√M, 1− e−T ) ≥ (1− (1/2)e−T )√M).
Using also the standard large deviation estimate
P (Binomial (K, p) ≥ K(p+ z)) ≤ exp(−Kz2/2(1− p)) for z ∈ (0, 1− p)
with (K, p) = (
√
M, 1− e−T ) and z = (1/2)e−T , we deduce that
P (Σ1T (B1) ≤ log(M) |D1 ∩D2 ∩D3 ∩D4)
≤ P (Binomial (
√
M, 1− e−T ) ≥
√
M (1− e−T + (1/2)e−T ))
≤ exp(−√M (1/4)e−2T/2e−T ) = exp(−(1/8) e−T √M)
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for all M sufficiently large. 
To deduce coexistence from the previous four lemmas, we now couple the interact-
ing particle system with one-dependent oriented site percolation in two dimensions
in which sites are open with probability 1 − ǫ. More precisely, we consider the
directed graph with vertex set
H = {(z, n) ∈ Z× Z+ : z + n is even}
and in which there is an oriented edge
(z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if z′ = z ± 1 and n′ = n+ 1.
Then, for the particle system, we declare (z, n) ∈ H to be good if
ΣnT (Bz) = minj=1,2 card {x ∈ Bz : ξnT (x) = j} > log(M),
indicating that there are at least log(M) players of each strategy in Bz at time nT ,
while oriented site percolation is defined by assuming that
P ((zi, ni) is open for i = 1, . . . ,m) = (1− ǫ)m
when |zi − zj | ∨ |ni − nj | > 1 for i 6= j. Finally, for all n ∈ N, we let
W ǫn = {z ∈ Z : (z, n) is wet} and Xn = {z ∈ Z : (z, n) is good}
where a site in H is said to be wet whenever it can be reached from a directed path
of open sites starting at level zero. The next lemma shows that, for all ǫ > 0, one
can find a sufficiently large dispersal range such that the set of good sites dominates
stochastically the set of wet sites. In view of the definition of a good site, this will
imply coexistence of both strategies.
Lemma 4.5. For all ǫ > 0, there is T > 0 such that, for all M large,
P (z ∈W ǫn) ≤ P (z ∈ Xn) for all (z, n) ∈ H whenever W ǫ0 ⊂ X0.
Proof: Fix T > 0 large such that Lemma 4.2 holds. Then, noting that D1 is the
event that site (0, 0) is good and using the multiplication rule, we get
P ((1, 1) is good | (0, 0) is good)
≥ P (ΣT (B1) > log(M) and D2 ∩D3 ∩D4 |D1)
= P (D2 |H1)P (D3 |H2)P (D4 |H3)P (Σ1T (B1) > log(M) |H4)
where Hi = D1∩· · ·∩Di for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Applying Lemmas 4.1–4.4, and observing
that, since the condition on the payoffs is symmetric, each of these four lemmas
also holds after exchanging the role of the two strategies, we deduce that
P ((1, 1) is good | (0, 0) is good)
≥ P (Σt(B0) 6= 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ) |H1) P (T (A1) ≤ T/2 |H2)
P (Σt(B1) >
√
M for some t ∈ (0, T ) |H3)
P (ΣT (B1) > log(M) |H4)
≥ (1 − 2 (1− e−T )log(M))(1− ǫ/4)
(1− 2/
√
M)(1 − 2 exp(−(1/8) e−T
√
M)) ≥ (1− ǫ/4)4 ≥ 1− ǫ
for all M large. By translation invariance of the graphical representation and
invariance by spatial symmetry of the evolution rules, we have more generally
P ((z ± 1, n+ 1) is good | (z, n) is good) ≥ 1− ǫ
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for allM large. Since also the proof of Lemmas 4.1–4.4 shows that this lower bound
holds uniformly in all the configurations outside the space-time region
(Bz ∪Bz±1)× [nT, (n+ 1)T ],
we deduce from [5, Theorem 4.3] the existence of a coupling between the particle
system and oriented site percolation such that
P (W ǫn ⊂ Xn) = 1 whenever W ǫ0 ⊂ X0
from which the lemma follows directly. 
To deduce coexistence, we fix ǫ > 0 sufficiently small to make the oriented perco-
lation process supercritical. Observing also that, starting from a product measure
with a positive density of both strategies, the number of good sites at level zero is
almost surely infinite, we obtain
limn→∞ P (0 ∈ W ǫ2n |W ǫ0 = X0) = α > 0. (4.5)
The parameter ǫ being fixed, we now fix T > 0 as in Lemma 4.5 so that each wet
site is also good for the coupling defined in the proof. Then, the definition of a
good site implies that there exists a positive constant β such that
P (ξ(2n+1)T (0) 6= ξ(2n+1)T (y − x) | 0 ∈W ǫ2n) ≥ β > 0 (4.6)
for all x 6= y and all M large. Combining (4.5)–(4.6) and using again translation
invariant in space, we conclude that
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y))
= lim infn→∞ P (ξ(2n+1)T (0) 6= ξ(2n+1)T (y − x))
≥ lim infn→∞ P (ξ(2n+1)T (0) 6= ξ(2n+1)T (y − x) | 0 ∈W ǫ2n)
P (0 ∈W ǫ2n |W ǫ0 = X0)
≥ αβ > 0
which completes the proof of the theorem.
5. The one-dimensional nearest neighbor process
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4. In particular, we
assume throughout this section that M = d = 1.
The proof of Theorem 2.3, which focuses on the parameter region (2.2), mainly
relies on techniques from the theory of martingales. To begin with, we consider the
process starting with only type 1 players to the left of and at the origin, i.e.,
ξ0 ∈ Λ− = {ξ ∈ {1, 2}Z : ξ(x) = 1 for all x ≤ 0}.
Our estimates hold uniformly in all possible ξ0 ∈ Λ−. Let
Xt = inf {z ∈ Z : ξt(z) = 2} − 1 and Kt = inf {z > 0 : ξt(Xt + z) = 1}
be respectively the position of the rightmost type 1 player with only type 1 players
to her left and the distance between this player and the next type 1 player to her
right, as shown in the following picture.
1 111 2 2 1 ? ?
Xt Xt +Kt
Kt = 3
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Figure 5.5. Payoff landscape around Xt for different values of Kt.
The first step of the proof is given by the following lemma which exhibits a super-
martingale using the golden ratio φ = (1/2)(1 +
√
5).
Lemma 5.1. Assume (2.2). Then, Zt = φ
−Xt is a supermartingale with respect
to the natural filtration of the death and birth of the fittest process.
Proof: For every set A and integer i, we set
p(ξt, A, i) = lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s −Xt ∈ A | ξt and Kt = i).
Note that Xt can only move by one unit except when the distance Kt to the next
player following strategy 1 is two, in which case it can make arbitrarily large jumps
to the right. Using Figure 5.5, which shows the payoffs that are relevant to compute
the rate of change of the process for different values of Kt, we obtain
p(ξt, {2, 3, . . .}, 2) = 1
p(ξt,−1, 2) = 1{a11 < a21}+ (1/2)1{a11 = a21} ≤ 1
(5.1)
with probability one. Similarly, since (2.2) holds,
p(ξt,+1, 3) = 1{a11 + a12 > a21 + a22}
+ (1/2)1{a11 + a12 = a21 + a22} = 1
p(ξt,−1, 3) = 1{2a11 < a21 + a22}
+ (1/2)1{2a11 = a21 + a22} = 0
(5.2)
with probability one, while for all i > 3,
p(ξt,+1, i) = 1{a11 + a12 > 2a22}
+ (1/2)1{a11 + a12 = 2a22} = 1
p(ξt,−1, i) = 1{2a11 < a21 + a22}
+ (1/2)1{2a11 = a21 + a22} = 0
(5.3)
with probability one. From (5.1), we deduce that
lims→0 s−1E (Zt+s − Zt | ξt and Kt = 2)
= lims→0 s−1E (φ−Xt+s − φ−Xt | ξt and Kt = 2)
≤ φ−Xt (φ−2 − 1) lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s ≥ Xt + 2 | ξt and Kt = 2)
+ φ−Xt (φ− 1) lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s = Xt − 1 | ξt and Kt = 2)
≤ Zt ((φ−2 − 1) + (φ− 1)) = Zt (φ−2 + φ− 2) = 0.
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Similarly, combining (5.2)–(5.3), we get that, for all i > 2,
lims→0 s−1E (Zt+s − Zt | ξt and Kt = i)
= φ−Xt (φ−1 − 1) lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s = Xt + 1 | ξt and Kt = i)
+ φ−Xt (φ− 1) lims→0 s−1 P (Xt+s = Xt − 1 | ξt and Kt = i)
= (φ−1 − 1)Zt ≤ 0.
This shows that the process (Zt) is a supermartingale. 
Lemma 5.2. Assume (2.2). Then,
P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t) ≥ 1− φ−1 for all ξ0 ∈ Λ−.
Proof: The idea is to apply the optional stopping theorem to (Zt), the supermartin-
gale found in the previous lemma, and to the stopping times
τ−1 = inf {t : Xt = −1} and τn = inf {t : Xt ≥ n} for all n > 0.
Note that Tn = min (τ−1, τn) is an almost surely finite stopping time because,
regardless of the configuration of the system, the process (Xt) jumps to the right
at rate one. Since in addition the initial position X0 ≥ 0, the optional stopping
theorem implies that
1 ≥ φ−X0 = E (Z0) ≥ E (ZTn)
≥ E (ZTn |Tn = τ−1)P (Tn = τ−1)
+ E (ZTn |Tn = τn)P (Tn = τn)
≥ φP (Tn = τ−1) = φ (1 − P (Tn = τn)).
(5.4)
Now, using that the event {Tn = τn} is nonincreasing in n for the inclusion, we also
deduce from the monotone convergence theorem that
P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t) ≥ P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t and limt→∞Xt =∞)
≥ P (Tn = τn for all n > 0)
= limn→∞ P (Tn = τn).
(5.5)
Combining (5.4)–(5.5), we conclude that, for all ξ0 ∈ Λ−,
P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t) ≥ limn→∞ P (Tn = τn)
≥ 1− φ−1 = (1/2)(3−√5),
which completes the proof. 
We now consider the process starting from a finite interval of type 1 players cen-
tered at the origin while the rest of the initial configuration is arbitrary. The basic
idea to deduce Theorem 2.3 is to study the type 1 connected component starting
at the origin, observing that the right and left boundaries of this component are
described respectively by the process (Xt) and its mirror image.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. To begin with, we define formally the type 1 connected
component starting at the origin as
C1(0) = {(y, t) ∈ Z×R+ : (x, 0) ↑ (y, t)}
where (x, 0) ↑ (y, t) means that there exist
x = x0, x1, . . . , xn = y and 0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn+1 = t
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such that the following two conditions hold:
• we have |xi − xi+1| = 1 for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 and
• we have ξs(z) = 1 for all (z, s) ∈
⋃
i=0,1,...,n({xi} × [tj , tj+1]).
In words, we can move forward in time from point (x, 0) to point (y, t) while staying
in a space-time region occupied by type 1 players. Then, define the left and right
boundaries of this connected component as
X−t = inf {z : (z, t) ∈ C1(0)} and X+t = sup {z : (z, t) ∈ C1(0)}
with the convention inf(∅) =∞ and sup(∅) = −∞. Then, it directly follows from
Lemma 5.2 that, for every integer m ≥ 1,
infξ0∈Λm P (ξt ∈ Λm for all t)
= infξ0∈Λm P (X
−
t ≤ −m and X+t ≥ m for all t)
= infξ0∈Λ− P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t) inf−ξ0∈Λ− P (−Xt ≤ 0 for all t)
= (infξ0∈Λ− P (Xt ≥ 0 for all t))2 ≥ (1 − φ−1)2 = (1/2)(7− 3
√
5).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
As previously mentioned, when starting with a translation invariant product mea-
sure with a positive density of each of the two strategies, since the initial configura-
tion contains infinitely many intervals with at least three type 1 players, it directly
follows from Theorem 2.3 and the ergodic theorem that strategy 1 wins with prob-
ability one in the parameter region (2.2). Using also obvious symmetry shows the
first two parts of Theorem 2.4.
We now focus on the last part of the theorem, which looks at the parameter
region where the process fixates to a random configuration in which both strategies
are present. The basic idea is to prove the existence of patterns with a mixture of
both types of players that are stable under the dynamics of the process.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3. Since both the evolution rules of the process and the
initial configuration are translation invariant, the function
u(t) = P (ξt(x)− ξt(x− 1) 6= 0) for all (x, t) ∈ Z×R+
does not depend on the choice of x. The function u can be viewed as the density
of interfaces. Because interfaces annihilate but do not give birth, the function u
is non-increasing so it has a limit l as time goes to infinity. We start with some
definitions and look at the three sub-regions in (2.4) separately.
By definition, a block is an interval
{x, x+ 1, . . . , x+ k} ⊂ Z
and its length is k + 1. We call this a block of 1s for a configuration ξ if
ξ(x) = ξ(x+ 1) = · · · = ξ(x + k) = 1
and a maximal block of 1s if in addition
ξ(x − 1) = ξ(x+ k + 1) = 2.
The analogous definition applies to 2s. A pattern is a finite configuration
σ = (σ0, σ1, . . . , σk) ⊂ {1, 2}k+1
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and we call this pattern stable if
(ξt(x+ i))
k
i=0 = σ implies (ξs(x+ i))
k
i=0 = σ for all s > t.
Case 1. Assume that
2a11 > a21 + a22 and 2a22 > a11 + a12.
By symmetry, we may assume a21 + a22 ≥ a11 + a12, which combining with the
above implies a11 > a12. We claim the patterns σ with
σi = 2 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k and k ≥ 2
are stable. To see this, first note the transition rates at vertex x depend only on
the states at that vertex and its four nearest neighbors. Let I = {x, . . . , x+ k} be
a maximal block of 2s for ξt with k ≥ 2. Since ξt(x− 1) = 1,
φ(x − 1, ξt) ≤ a12 +max (a11, a12) ≤ a11 + a12 < 2a22 = φ(x + 1, ξt)
therefore ξt(x) has flip rate zero; by symmetry, the same holds for ξt(x + k) while
this is trivially true for the other sites in the block because they are in the same
state as their neighbors. The claim follows.
Since the initial configuration ξ0 is distributed according to a product measure
with a positive density of 2s, with probability one, the lattice Z is partitioned by ξ0
into a succession of maximal blocks of 2s, say (Ij)j∈Z, of length at least three,
separated by finite blocks (Kj)j∈Z of length at least one. Since the Ij are stable
and longer than the range of dependence, the restriction of the process (ξt) on
each of the finite blocks Kj , independently for different j, evolves like a finite state
Markov chain on the state space of patterns with length card (Kj)+ 4, with a fixed
pair of type 2 sites at each boundary. Thus, fixation follows once we show that for
any fixed finite length, such a chain is absorbing, and to do so we need to show
that for any finite length pattern there is a sequence of flips, each with positive
rate, that leads to an absorbing configuration. We do this by sequentially removing
maximal blocks of certain types, until only stable types remain.
For a maximal block of length one, both neighbors are of opposite type, which
makes the flip rate positive. Thus, by flipping the type of all such blocks, we may
assume that maximal blocks all have length at least two. Once this is done,
(1) maximal blocks of 1s of length two can be removed while
(2) maximal blocks of 1s of length at least three are stable
To see the first statement, note that in the pattern
σ = (2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2),
the central 1s both have positive flip rate since, under our assumption above, their
type 1 neighbor has payoff a11+a12 ≤ a21+a22, the payoff of their type 2 neighbor.
For the second statement, it suffices to show the leftmost 1 in
σ = (2, 2, 1, 1, 1)
has flip rate zero, which is clear as its type 2 neighbor has payoff a21 + a22 < 2a11,
the payoff of its type 1 neighbor. It remains to consider maximal blocks of length
two, with type 2. In light of the above, we may assume a pattern of the form
σ = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1),
and that both triplets of 1s are stable. Then, by symmetry, each 2 has the same
flip rate, which is either positive or zero. In the first case the pair of 2s can be
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removed, otherwise the pattern is stable. This completes the argument and proves
fixation of the process.
It remains to show that the limiting density of both 1s and 2s is positive. To do
this, let ρ be the density of 1s in the initial product measure. Since blocks of 2s of
length at least three are stable, for any x ∈ Z,
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 2) ≥ P (ξ0(x+ i) = 2, i = 0, 1, 2) = (1 − ρ)3 > 0.
Looking now at type 1, since as shown above, blocks of 1s of length at least three
have flip rate zero when the adjacent maximal blocks of 2s have length at least two,
by sandwiching a block of 1s of length three between two blocks of 2s of length
three to ensure stability, we find that
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 1) ≥ ρ3 (1− ρ)6 > 0.
This completes the proof in the first case.
Case 2. Assume that
2a11 > a21 + a22 > a11 + a12.
If in addition 2a22 > a11 + a12, this becomes a particular case of Case 1 that we
have already treated above so we may assume that 2a22 ≤ a11+a12. Together with
the above, this implies that
a11 > a22 and a21 > a22 and a21 > a12.
First, we claim that
(ξ0(x+ i))
2
i=0 6= (1, 2, 1)
implies that (ξt(x+ i))
2
i=0 6= (1, 2, 1) for all t > 0.
(5.6)
Since the transitions
(1, 1, 1)→ (1, 2, 1) and (2, 2, 2, 1)→ (2, 1, 2, 1)
are not possible, and since the size of a maximal block decreases by at most one at
any transition, it suffices to show the transition
(1, 2, 2, 1)→ (1, 1, 2, 1)
cannot occur. This holds because if sites x and x+1 are in state 2 while sites x− 1
and x+ 2 are in state 2 then
φ(x− 1, ξt) ≤ a12 +max (a11, a12) < a21 + a22 = φ(x + 1, ξt).
In particular, the state at site x cannot flip. Symmetry implies that the same holds
for site x+ 1 so our first claim (5.6) follows.
Next, we claim that for k ≥ 6,
(ξ0(x+ i))
k
i=0 = (2, 2, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 2, 2)
implies that (ξt(x+ i))
k−2
i=2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) for all t > 0.
(5.7)
It follows from (5.6) and our assumption that
(ξt(x+ i))
2
i=0 6= (1, 2, 1) for all t > 0.
Assuming the conclusion in (5.7) holds at time t,
(ξt(x), ξt(x+ 1)) = (1, 1) or (2, 1) or (2, 2).
The flip rate at x + 2 is trivially zero in the first two cases. In the case of (2, 2),
the payoff at site x + 1 is a21 + a22 < 2a11, the payoff at x + 3, so the flip rate is
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still zero. Symmetry completes the argument.
As in Case 1, the lattice Z is partitioned by ξ0 into blocks (Ij)j∈Z and (Kj)j∈Z,
where in this case, on each block Ij , ξ0 is of the form
(2, 2, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 2, 2)
and each Kj is finite. We proceed as before to show the chain on Kj is absorbing.
As before, we may assume there are no maximal blocks of length one. A maximal
block of 2s of length greater than two may shrink, since in the pattern
(1, 1, 2, 2, . . . , 2),
the leftmost 2 has a type 1 neighbor with payoff a11 + a12 ≥ 2a22, the payoff of its
type 2 neighbor. Thus we may assume all maximal blocks of 2s have length two.
A maximal block of 1s of length two may shrink, as is easily checked from
(2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2),
so we may assume maximal blocks of 1s have length at least three. In light of the
previous claims, a pattern whose maximal blocks of 2s have length at most two,
and whose maximal blocks of 1s have length at least three, is stable, completing
the argument.
To conclude, it remains to show that the limiting density of each type is positive
whenever ρ ∈ (0, 1). To deal with type 1, since the subset
(1, 1, 1) in (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2)
is stable, we find that
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 1) ≥ ρ3 (1− ρ)4 > 0.
On the other hand, since the subset
(1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1) in (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2)
is stable, we find that
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 2) ≥ ρ6 (1 − ρ)6.
This completes the proof of the second case.
Case 3. Assume that 2a22 > a11 + a12 > a21 + a22. Fixation in this case can be
deduced from the previous case using some obvious symmetry. 
The proof of Theorem 2.4 is now complete.
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